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Bradley’s	  regress:	  relations,	  exemplification,	  unity	  
	  	  	  	  1.	  Preliminaries	  
	  	   In	  his	  long	  Wirkungsgeschichte	  F.H.	  Bradley’s	  regress	  argument	  has	  been	  put	  to	  many	  different	  uses.	  Not	  only	  that,	  but	  several	  different	  interpretations	  have	  been	   advanced	   as	   to	   what	   Bradley	   “really”	   wanted	   to	   say	   with	   his	   argument.	  Such	  interpretations	  differ	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  final	  thesis	  supposedly	  argued	  for	  by	  Bradley,	  and	  also	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  real	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  regress.	  For	  a	  long	  time,	  the	  main	  part	  of	  the	  debate	  concerning	  the	  regress	  argument	  focused	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  relations,	  i.e.,	  whether	  they	  are	  to	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  internal	  (as	  Bradley	  is	  often	  believed	  to	  claim)	  or	  as	  external.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  regress	  was	   seen	   as	   an	   argument	   purporting	   to	   show	   that	   external	   relations	   are	  somehow	   contradictory,	   and	   that	   therefore	   only	   internal	   relations	   are	  admissible.	   To	   be	   sure,	   there	   are	   some	   reasonable	   textual	   bases	   for	   this	  interpretation.	  Yet	   its	   success	  was	   chiefly	  due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  Bertrand	  Russell	  and	  G.E.	  Moore	  chose	  the	  nature	  of	  relations	  as	  one	  of	   the	  main	  battle	  grounds	  for	   their	   polemic	   against	   idealism	   in	   general	   and	   Bradley	   in	   particular.	   In	   this	  way,	  they	  set	  the	  course	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  Bradley’s	  regress	  for	  several	  decades1.	  	   In	  more	  recent	  times,	  a	  different	  interpretative	  focus	  has	  emerged,	  according	  to	   which	   the	   real	   subject	   matter	   of	   the	   regress	   argument	   is	   the	   issue	   of	   the	  “unity”	   or	   “connectedness”,	   either	   of	   facts,	   or	   of	   states	   of	   affairs,	   or	   of	  propositions,	   or	   more	   in	   general	   of	   “complexes”.	   Bradley’s	   regress	   has	   thus	  gradually	   become	   one	   of	   the	   standard	   arguments	   that	  must	   be	   reckoned	  with	  when	  dealing	  with	  this	  sort	  of	  ontological	  questions:	  it	  suffices	  here	  to	  mention,	  in	   no	   particular	   order,	   the	   works	   of	   Gustav	   Bergmann,	   David	   M.	   Armstrong,	  Kenneth	  R.	  Olson,	  Donald	  W.	  Mertz,	  William	  F.	   Vallicella,	   Francesco	  Orilia,	   and	  many	  others2.	  In	  all	  these	  debates	  the	  regress	  argument	  is	  usually	  assumed	  in	  a	  rather	  stereotyped	  formulation,	  which	  is	  more	  or	  less	  the	  following:	  	   (A)	  No	  mere	  aggregate	  (enumeration,	  list,	  etc.)	  of	  constituents	  amounts	  to	  the	  fact	  (state	  of	  affairs,	  complex,	  etc.)	  somehow	  “made	  up”	  of	  those	  constituents;	  in	  other	  words,	  given	  a	  and	  F,	  the	  fact	  Fa	  is	  not	  therefore	  automatically	  given;	  what	  is	  lacking	  is	  of	  course	  the	  “unity”	  or	  “connectedness”	  of	  the	  constituents	  themselves	  into	  a	  fact;	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Among	  Russell	   and	  Moore’s	   contributions	   to	   the	   debate	   cf.	   Russell	   1900	   and	  Moore	   1920.	   A	  significant	  episode	  of	  this	  story	  was	  the	  symposium	  at	  the	  joint	  session	  of	  the	  Aristotelian	  Society	  and	   the	   Mind	   Association	   in	   1935,	   devoted	   to	   “Internal	   relations”,	   whose	   participants	   were	  Gilbert	  Ryle	  and	  A.J.	  Ayer	  (Ryle	  –	  Ayer	  1935).	  2	  As	  samples	  of	  this	  attitude	  with	  respect	  to	  Bradley’s	  regress,	  cf.	  Bergmann	  1960,	  Olson,	  1987,	  Mertz	  1996	  (chapter	  VIII),	  Armstrong	  1997	  (pp.	  114-­‐115),	  Vallicella	  2000,	  Vallicella	  2002,	  Orilia	  2006.	  An	  ample	  critical	  survey	  of	  this	  literature	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Cimmino	  2009	  (chapter	  I).	  On	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  unity	  of	  complexes,	  with	  obvious	  references	  to	  Bradley,	  cf.	  also	  Davidson	  2005	  and	  Gaskin	  2008.	  
(B)	  Adding	   to	   the	   list	   a	   further	   constituent	   that	   is	   to	  be	   responsible	   for	   the	  unity	  will	   not	   do,	   since	  what	  we	   get	   is	   just	   another	   (longer)	   list,	   for	  which	  exactly	  the	  same	  problem	  of	  unity	  occurs.	  	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   Bradley’s	   regress	   literally	   corresponds	   to	   part	   (B)	   of	   this	  formulation,	   but	   it	   is	   also	   clear	   that	   it	   gets	   its	   overall	   significance	   by	   a	   joint	  consideration	  of	   both	  parts	   (we	  may	   refer	   to	   the	   complete	   argument	   as	   (A-­‐B);	  part	  (A)	  is	  presumably	  regarded	  as	  simply	  unexpressed	  or	  only	  dimly	  expressed	  by	  Bradley	   himself.	   In	   any	   case	   these	   debates	   among	   ontologists	   usually	   show	  little	   interest	   for	   the	   historical	   Bradley,	   an	   attitude	   which	   is	   of	   course	   fully	  legitimate.	  Yet,	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  unity,	  for	  Bradley	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Russell,	   has	   been	   recently	   emphasized	   also	   from	   a	   strictly	   historical	   point	   of	  view,	  dating	  at	  least	  from	  the	  works	  of	  Peter	  Hylton3.	  	   The	   question	   of	   the	   unity	   of	   complexes	   has	   very	   often	   been	   viewed	   as	  revolving	   around	   the	   notion	   of	   exemplification,	   is	   so	   far	   as	   exemplification	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  “connection”	  that	  brings	  about	  the	  unity	  of	  complexes	  such	  as	  facts:	   exemplification	   connects	   a	   universal	   (property	   or	   relation)	   and	   one	   or	  more	  particulars	  into	  one	  fact.	  In	  this	  context,	  Bradley’s	  regress	  has	  been	  used	  to	  support	  widely	  differing	  conclusions,	  since	  agreeing	  on	  the	  subject	  matter	  of	  the	  argument	  does	  not	  imply	  agreeing	  on	  its	  claims.	  Bergmann,	  for	  instance,	  used	  it	  to	  hold	  that,	   in	  order	  to	  account	  for	  facts,	  a	  special	  category	  of	  entities	  must	  be	  admitted,	  the	  nexus,	  in	  addition	  to	  (ordinary)	  relations:	  exemplification	  is	  for	  him	  one	   of	   such	   nexus.	   But	   the	   regress	   could	   also	   be	   used	   to	   argue	   against	  exemplification:	  since	  relations	  are	  clearly	  useless	  in	  accounting	  for	  the	  unity	  of	  facts,	   their	   “duplication”	   by	   means	   of	   nexus	   is	   equally	   doomed	   to	   failure.	   For	  some	   philosophers	   (Bergmann	   and	   Armstrong,	   for	   example)	   the	   regress	  argument	   is	   perfectly	   consistent	   with	   the	   existence	   of	   universals;	   others,	   like	  Wilfrid	   Sellars,	   pushed	   the	   negative	   argument	   against	   exemplification	   a	   step	  further,	   and	   used	   the	   regress	   as	   a	  weapon	   against	   universals	   and	   in	   favour	   of	  nominalism4.	  	   In	   any	   case,	   I	   am	  not	   interested	  here	   in	   the	   supposed	   claims	  of	   the	   regress	  argument:	  by	  the	  way,	  none	  of	  those	  just	  mentioned	  could	  be	  Bradley’s	  genuine	  claims,	   if	   for	   no	   other	   reason	   than	   notions	   such	   as	   universal,	   particular,	  exemplification,	  etc.	  do	  not	  make	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  Bradley’s	  philosophy,	  or	  at	  least	  in	   that	   context	   they	  have	  a	  meaning	  which	   is	  very	  different	   from	   that	  which	   is	  common	   in	   contemporary	   ontological	   debates.	   As	   to	   the	   question	   of	  exemplification,	  if	  by	  this	  notion	  we	  mean	  a	  connection	  between	  a	  universal	  and	  one	   or	  more	   particulars,	   then	   Bradley’s	   regress	   certainly	   does	   not	   specifically	  concern	   exemplification,	   for	   the	   same	   reasons	   as	   before.	   Rather,	   it	   concerns	  exemplification	   just	  as	  a	  special	  case,	  a	  particular	  way	  to	  account	   for	  unity	   in	  a	  specified	   ontological	   framework.	   In	   this	   sense,	   if	   it	   is	   true	   at	   all	   that	   the	   real	  subject	   matter	   of	   the	   regress	   argument	   is	   that	   of	   unity	   or	   connectedness,	   its	  problem	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  that	  of	  exemplification	  only	  as	  a	  sort	  of	  synecdoche,	  in	  which	  a	  special	  case	  (exemplification)	  is	  made	  to	  represent	  the	  whole	  (the	  unity	  of	   facts	   or	   complexes	   in	   general).	   Therefore	   in	  what	   follows	   it	   will	   usually	   be	  spoken	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  unity	  rather	  than	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  exemplification,	  even	  if	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Cf.	  Hylton	  1984,	  Hylton	  1990.	  4	  Cf.	  Sellars	  1962,	  Sellars	  1980.	  
latter	   has	   come	   to	   monopolize	   much	   of	   the	   discussion	   in	   some	   philosophical	  quarters.	   However,	   what	   possibly	   applies	   to	   unity	   in	   general,	   will	   apply	   to	  exemplification	  in	  particular.	  	   The	  aim	  of	  the	  remaining	  part	  of	  the	  article	   is	  to	  inquire	  whether	  the	  “unity	  interpretation”	  of	   the	   regress	   argument	  –	   such	  as	  has	  been	   summarized	   in	   (A)	  and	  (B)	  above	  –	  can	  be	  supported	  by	  textual	  evidences.	  While	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	   general	   historical	   importance	   of	   the	   issue	   of	   unity	   for	   Bradley	   has	   been	  established	   beyond	   any	   doubt	   (some	   further	   evidence	  will	   be	   provided	   in	   the	  next	   section),	   and	  while	   the	   “unity	   interpretation”	   has	   become	   something	   of	   a	  
lieu	   commun	   in	   contemporary	   ontology,	   it	   seems	   to	   me	   that	   some	   links	   are	  wanting	   between	   the	   Bradley’s	   regress	   of	   contemporary	   ontologists	   and	   the	  Bradley’s	   regress	   of	   Bradley.	   In	   other	  words,	   I	  would	   like	   to	   cover	   the	  middle	  ground	   between	   the	   argument	   formulated	   in	   (A)	   and	   (B)	   and	   the	   passages	   in	  which	  Bradley	  explicitly	  put	  forth	  the	  regress.	  Given	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  argument	  of	  (A)	  and	  (B)	  is	  certainly	  present	  to	  Bradley,	  it	  remains	  to	  be	  confirmed	  that	  it	  was	  exactly	   the	   argument	   he	   had	   in	   mind	   when	   formulating	   the	   regress.	   It	   is	   my	  contention	  that	  it	  is,	  and	  that	  the	  unity	  interpretation	  is	  on	  the	  whole	  correct,	  but	  if	  we	  read	  Bradley’s	   texts	   that	   is	  not	   immediately	  obvious,	  and	  some	  exegetical	  work	  is	  required	  to	  get	  to	  this	  conclusion.	  	  	  2.	  Regress	  and	  unity	  
	  	   The	   regress	   argument	  does	  not	   stand	  very	  prominent	   in	  Bradley’s	  work,	   at	  least	   in	   comparison	   with	   its	   renown.	   Only	   a	   couple	   of	   clear	   and	   explicit	  formulations	   can	   be	   found,	   in	   The	   Principles	   of	   Logic	   and	   in	   Appearance	   and	  
Reality,	   with	   the	   addition	   of	   some	  more	   or	   less	   relevant	   variations5.	   The	  most	  famous	  formulation	  of	  the	  argument,	  the	  one	  that	  is	  almost	  invariably	  referred	  to	  –	   if	  a	   formulation	   is	  referred	  to	  at	  all	   in	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  regress	  –,	  occurs	  rather	  close	  to	  the	  beginning	  of	  Appearance	  and	  Reality,	  more	  exactly	  in	  chapter	  II:	  	   (1)	   Let	   us	   abstain	   from	  making	   the	   relation	   an	   attribute	   of	   the	   related,	   and	   let	   us	  make	  it	  more	  or	  less	  independent.	  ‘There	  is	  a	  relation	  C,	  in	  which	  A	  and	  B	  stand;	  and	  it	  appears	  with	  both	  of	  them’.	  But	  here	  again	  we	  have	  made	  no	  progress.	  The	  relation	  
C	  has	   been	   admitted	   different	   from	  A	   and	  B,	   and	   no	   longer	   is	   predicated	   of	   them.	  Something,	  however,	  seems	  to	  be	  said	  of	  this	  relation	  C,	  and	  said,	  again,	  of	  A	  and	  B.	  And	   this	   something	   is	   not	   to	   be	   the	   ascription	   of	   one	   to	   the	   other.	   If	   so,	   it	   would	  appear	   to	  be	  another	   relation,	  D,	   in	  which	  C,	   on	  one	  side,	  and,	  on	   the	  other	  side,	  A	  and	  B,	   stand.	   But	   such	   a	  makeshift	   leads	   at	   once	   to	   the	   infinite	   process.	   The	   new	  relation	  D	  can	  be	  predicated	  in	  no	  way	  of	  C,	  or	  of	  A	  and	  B;	  and	  hence	  we	  must	  have	  recourse	  to	  a	  fresh	  relation,	  E,	  which	  comes	  between	  D	  and	  whatever	  we	  had	  before.	  But	   this	  must	   lead	   to	   another,	   F;	   and	   so	   on,	   indefinitely.	   Thus	   the	   problem	   is	   not	  solved	   by	   taking	   relations	   as	   independently	   real.	   For,	   if	   so,	   the	   qualities	   and	   their	  relation	  fall	  entirely	  apart,	  and	  then	  we	  have	  said	  nothing.	  Or	  we	  have	  to	  make	  a	  new	  relation	  between	   the	  old	   relation	   and	   the	   terms;	  which,	  when	   it	   is	  made,	   does	  not	  help	  us.	  It	  either	  itself	  demands	  a	  new	  relation,	  and	  so	  on	  without	  end,	  or	  it	  leaves	  us	  where	  we	  were,	  entangled	  in	  difficulties.6	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Cf.	  Bradley	  1893,	  pp.	  26-­‐27.	  6	  Bradley	  1893,	  pp.	  17-­‐18.	  
	   At	   first	   sight,	   this	   passage	   only	   corresponds	   to	   part	   (B)	   of	   the	   unity	  interpretation	   of	   the	   argument;	   part	   (A)	   should	   therefore	   be	   provided	   by	   the	  reader’s	   sagacity.	   Moreover,	   the	   argument	   is	   formulated	   strictly	   in	   terms	   of	  relations,	  and	  of	  relations	  regarded	  as	  “more	  or	  less	  independent”,	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  of	  “external”	  relations.	  Thus	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  argument,	  at	  least	  if	  taken	  literally,	  seems	  to	  be	  rather	  limited:	  the	  interpretation	  that	  it	  mainly	  concerns	  (external)	  relations,	   and	   that	   it	  must	   be	   addressed	   on	   those	   terms,	   presents	   itself	   as	   the	  most	   natural.	   The	   other	   explicit	   formulation	   of	   the	   regress	   does	   not	   provide	  significantly	  new	  elements:	  	   (2)	  When	  we	  ask	  “What	   is	   the	  composition	  of	  Mind”,	  we	  break	  up	  that	  state,	  which	  comes	  to	  us	  as	  a	  whole,	  into	  units	  of	  feeling.	  But	  since	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  these	  units	  by	  themselves	  are	  not	  all	  the	  “composition”,	  we	  are	  forced	  to	  recognize	  the	  existence	  of	  relations.	   But	   this	   does	   not	   stagger	   us.	  We	   push	   on	  with	   the	   conceptions	  we	   have	  brought	   to	   the	  work,	  and	  which	  of	  course	  can	  not	  be	   false,	  and	  we	  say,	  Oh	  yes,	  we	  have	  here	  some	  more	  units,	  naturally	  not	  quite	   the	  same	  as	   the	  others,	  and	  –	  voilà	  
tout.	   But	   when	   a	   sceptical	   reader,	   whose	   mind	   has	   been	   warped	   by	   a	   different	  education,	   attempts	   to	   form	  an	   idea	   of	  what	   is	  meant,	   he	   is	   somewhat	   at	   a	   loss.	   If	  units	  have	  to	  exist	  together,	  they	  must	  stand	  in	  relation	  to	  one	  another;	  and,	  if	  these	  relations	   are	   also	   units,	   it	   would	   seem	   that	   the	   second	   class	   must	   also	   stand	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  first.	  If	  A	  and	  B	  are	  feelings,	  and	  if	  C	  their	  relation	  is	  another	  feeling,	  you	  must	  either	  suppose	  that	  component	  parts	  can	  exist	  without	  standing	  in	  relation	  with	  one	  another,	  or	  else	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fresh	  relation	  between	  C	  and	  AB.	  Let	  this	  be	  
D,	   and	   once	   more	   we	   are	   launched	   on	   the	   infinite	   process	   of	   finding	   a	   relation	  between	  D	  and	  C-­‐AB;	  and	  so	  on	  for	  ever.7	  	  With	  respect	  to	  text	  (1),	  only	  one	  suggestion	  seems	  here	  new,	  and	  it	  brings	  the	  argument	  somewhat	  nearer	  to	  (A-­‐B):	  it	  is	  the	  hint	  at	  the	  “component	  parts”	  that	  “can	   exist	   without	   standing	   in	   relation	   with	   one	   another”,	   which	   reminds	   the	  idea	   of	   a	   mere	   aggregate,	   list,	   etc.,	   which	   can	   remain	   an	   aggregate	   or	   a	   list	  without	   ever	   becoming	   a	   fact	   (a	   genuine	   complex).	   But	   on	   the	   whole,	   the	  emphasis	  is	  still	  on	  relations	  and,	  what	  is	  worse,	  the	  whole	  discussion	  seems	  to	  be	  embedded	  in	  a	  psychological	  context,	  having	  to	  do	  with	  mind,	  feelings,	  etc.	  If	  one	   thinks	   of	   the	   importance	   that	   is	   usually	   attributed	   to	   the	   regress	   for	   the	  overall	   philosophy	   of	   Bradley,	   it	   may	   also	   seem	   strange	   that	   the	   regress	  argument	  is	  apparently	  introduced	  in	  such	  a	  subordinated	  position,	  almost	  as	  a	  minor	  aside	  within	  a	  long	  treatise	  on	  logic.	  	   Yet	   text	   (2)	   comes	   after	   a	   passage	   in	   which	   Bradley	   deals	   in	   very	   general	  terms	  with	  the	  issue	  of	  analysis:	  	   (3)	  It	  is	  a	  very	  common	  and	  most	  ruinous	  superstition	  to	  suppose	  that	  analysis	  is	  no	  alteration,	  and	  that,	  whenever	  we	  distinguish,	  we	  have	  at	  once	  to	  do	  with	  divisible	  existence.	   It	   is	   an	   immense	   assumption	   to	   conclude,	  when	   a	   fact	   comes	   to	   us	   as	   a	  whole,	  that	  some	  parts	  of	  it	  may	  exist	  without	  any	  sort	  of	  regard	  for	  the	  rest	  […]	  It	  is	  wholly	   unjustifiable	   to	   take	   up	   a	   complex,	   to	   do	   any	   work	   we	   please	   upon	   it	   by	  analysis,	  and	  then	  simply	  predicate	  as	  an	  adjective	  of	  the	  given	  these	  results	  of	  our	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Bradley	  1883,	  p.	  96.	  
abstraction.	  These	  products	  were	  never	  there	  as	  such,	  and	  in	  saying,	  as	  we	  do,	  that	  as	  such	  they	  are	  there,	  we	  falsify	  the	  fact.8	  	  The	  general	  sense	  of	  the	  regress	  argument	  now	  appears	  more	  evident:	  it	  is	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  attack	  on	  the	  notion	  of	  analysis,	  i.e.,	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  whole	  (a	  complex)	  can	  be	  reduced	  without	  residue	  to	  its	  constituent	  parts.	  Of	  course,	  the	  problem	  of	  analysis	  is	  just	  the	  specular	  image	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  unity,	  and	  Bradley’s	  holistic	  solution,	  according	  to	  which	  unities	  must	  ultimately	  be	  assumed	  as	   irreducible,	  makes	  analysis	  ultimately	  impossible.	  The	  regress	  is	  part	  of	  an	  argument	  (made	  up	  by	  steps	  (A)	  and	  (B))	  aiming	  at	  showing	  that,	  if	  we	  adopt	  the	  premisses	  that	  makes	  analysis	  possible,	  unity	  cannot	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  any	  way.	  All	  that	  was	  at	   the	   centre	   of	   Bradley’s	   exchanges	   of	   views	   with	   Russell,	   which	   had	   the	  opposite	   preoccupation:	   he	   wanted	   to	   secure	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   analysis,	   and	  therefore	  had	  to	  struggle	  with	  the	  problem	  of	  unity,	  of	  which	  he	  was	  well	  aware.	  The	   exchange	   of	   views	   on	   this	   topic	   is	   widely	   documented.	   In	   a	   famous	  passage	   of	  The	   Principles	   of	   Mathematics	  Russell	   perfectly	   sums	   up	   the	   whole	  problem:	  	  Consider	   for	   example	   the	   proposition	   “A	   differs	   from	   B”.	   The	   constituents	   of	   this	  proposition,	   if	   we	   analyze	   it,	   appear	   to	   be	   only	   A,	   difference,	   B.	   Yet	   these	  constituents,	   thus	   placed	   side	   by	   side,	   do	   not	   reconstitute	   the	   proposition.	   The	  difference	   which	   occurs	   in	   the	   proposition	   actually	   relates	   A	   and	   B,	   whereas	   the	  difference	  after	  analysis	  is	  a	  notion	  which	  has	  no	  connection	  with	  A	  and	  B.	  It	  may	  be	  said	  that	  we	  ought,	  in	  the	  analysis,	  to	  mention	  the	  relations	  which	  difference	  has	  to	  A	  and	  B	   […]	  These	   relations	   consist	   in	   the	   fact	   that	  A	   is	   referent	   and	  B	  relatum	  with	  respect	  to	  difference.	  But	  “A,	  referent,	  difference,	  relatum,	  B”	   is	  still	  merely	  a	   list	  of	  terms,	   not	   a	   proposition.	   A	   proposition,	   in	   fact,	   is	   essentially	   a	   unity,	   and	   when	  analysis	   has	   destroyed	   the	   unity,	   no	   enumeration	   of	   constituents	   will	   restore	   the	  proposition.9	  	  
	  If	   we	   prescind	   from	   Russell’s	   own	   peculiar	   terminology	   and	   the	   ontological	  framework	   based	   on	   the	   notions	   of	   term	   and	   proposition,	   the	   passage	   is	   an	  accurate	   reformulation	   of	   the	   argument	   (A-­‐B).	   It	   almost	   comes	   as	   a	   suspicion	  that	  many	  contemporary	  philosophers,	  when	  speaking	  of	  Bradley’s	  regress,	  have	  in	  mind	  Russell’s	  formulation,	  rather	  than	  Bradley’s.	  In	  any	  case	  Bradley	  did	  not	  miss	  Russell’s	  difficulties	  with	  unity,	  and	  in	  Appearance,	  Error,	  and	  Contradiction	  he	  pointed	  them	  out,	  holding	  that	  if	  propositions	  cannot	  really	  be	  analysed	  into	  terms	   and	   relations,	   then	   terms	   and	   relations	   are	   not	   all	   there	   is,	   contrary	   to	  what	  Russell’s	  atomism	  seems	  to	  suggest:	  	   On	  the	  one	  side	  I	  am	  led	  to	  think	  that	  [Russell]	  defends	  a	  strict	  pluralism,	  for	  which	  nothing	  is	  admissible	  beyond	  simple	  terms	  and	  external	  relations.	  On	  the	  other	  side	  Mr.	  Russell	   seems	   to	   assert	   emphatically,	   and	   to	  use	   throughout,	   ideas	   that	   such	   a	  pluralism	  must	  repudiate.	  He	  throughout	  stands	  upon	  unities	  which	  are	  complex	  and	  which	  cannot	  be	  analysed	  into	  terms	  and	  relations.	  These	  two	  positions	  to	  my	  mind	  are	  irreconcilable.10	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  Bradley	  1883,	  p.	  95.	  9	  Russell	  1903,	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  49-­‐50.	  10	  Bradley	  1910,	  p.	  179.	  
At	  first,	  Russell	  replied	  in	  a	  letter:	  	   Yes,	   I	   am	   a	   strict	   pluralist,	   but	   I	   do	   not	   consider	   pluralism	   incompatible	   with	   the	  existence	  of	  complex	  entities.	  I	  consider	  that	  in	  every	  case	  where	  two	  simples	  have	  a	  relation,	  there	  is	  a	  complex	  entity	  consisting	  of	  the	  two	  simples	  so	  related.11	  	  A	   public	   response	   followed	   quickly,	   in	  which	  Russell	   remarked	   that	   the	  whole	  dispute	  rests	  upon	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  unities	  can	  or	  cannot	  be	  analysed:	  	   I	   do	   not	   admit	   that,	   in	   any	   strict	   sense,	   unities	   are	   incapable	   of	   analysis;	   on	   the	  contrary,	  I	  hold	  that	  they	  are	  the	  only	  objects	  that	  can	  be	  analyzed.	  What	  I	  admit	  is	  that	   no	   enumeration	   of	   their	   constituents	   will	   reconstitute	   them,	   since	   any	   such	  enumeration	  gives	  us	  a	  plurality,	  not	  a	  unity.12	  	  	  Both	   answers	   seem	   merely	   to	   state	   the	   problem,	   rather	   than	   solving	   it,	   and	  Bradley	  did	  not	  give	  up:	  	   Is	   there	   anything,	   I	   ask,	   in	   a	   unity	   beside	   its	   “constituents”,	   i.e.	   the	   terms	   and	   the	  relation,	  and,	  if	  there	  is	  anything	  more,	  in	  what	  does	  this	  “more”	  consist?	  […]	  What	  is	  the	   difference	   between	   a	   relation	  which	   relates	   in	   fact	   and	  one	  which	  does	  not	   so	  relate?13	  	  The	  public	  exchange	  stopped	  here,	  but	  in	  a	  private	  letter	  to	  Bradley	  Russell	  had	  to	   admit:	   “With	   regard	   to	   unities,	   I	   have	   nothing	   short	   to	   say.	   The	   subject	   is	  difficult	  (in	  any	  philosophy,	  I	  should	  say),	  and	  I	  do	  not	  pretend	  to	  have	  solved	  all	  problems”14.	  	   We	  can	  come	  up	  at	  this	  point	  with	  a	  couple	  of	  temporary	  conclusions:	  (i)	  The	  importance	  of	   the	  general	   issue	  of	  unity	   for	  Bradley	  has	  been	  confirmed;	   (ii)	   It	  has	   been	   shown	   that	   one	   of	   Bradley’s	   explicit	   formulations	   of	   the	   regress	  argument	  (text	  (2))	  is	  set	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  general	  issue	  of	  unity.	  It	  remains	  to	  be	   seen	  whether	   in	  Bradley’s	  own	  presentation	  of	   the	   regress	  we	  can	   really	  find	  –	  in	  a	  more	  or	  less	  straightforward	  form	  –	  the	  whole	  of	  argument	  (A-­‐B).	  To	  that	  end,	  we	  have	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  text	  (1),	  the	  standard	  reference	  for	  the	  regress	  argument.	  	  	  3.	  Bradley’s	  formulation	  
	  	   At	   first	   sight,	   the	   situation	   is	   not	   very	   promising.	   As	   has	   already	   been	  remarked,	  in	  text	  (1)	  the	  regress	  is	  formulated	  in	  terms	  of	  relations,	  and	  a	  strong	  emphasis	  is	  put	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  relations	  are	  conceived	  of	  as	  “independent”,	  i.e.,	  as	  external.	  One	  could	  reasonably	  conclude	  that	  the	  regress	  has	  to	  do	  exclusively,	  or	   at	   least	   primarily,	  with	   the	  nature	   of	   relations,	   and	  more	   specifically	   that	   it	  argues	  against	  a	  view	  that	  conceives	  of	  them	  as	  “external”.	  This	  –	  as	  pointed	  out	  at	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   article	   –	   has	   been	   a	   widespread	   interpretation	   of	   the	  argument	  and,	  in	  a	  sense,	  it	  is	  not	  completely	  wrong:	  with	  the	  regress	  argument	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Russell	  1992,	  p.	  350.	  12	  Russell	  1910,	  p.	  373.	  13	  Bradley	  1911,	  p.	  74.	  14	  Russell	  1992,	  p.	  352.	  
Bradley	  certainly	  wanted,	  among	  other	  things,	   to	  make	  some	  claims	  concerning	  (external)	  relations15.	  But	  if	  this	  were	  the	  only	  import	  of	  the	  argument,	  then	  its	  significance	   for	   the	   general	   issue	   of	   unity	   would	   be	   limited	   indeed:	   in	   fact,	   it	  would	  have	  no	  relevance	  at	  all	  for	  any	  form	  of	  unity	  that	  did	  not	  explicitly	  relied	  on	  external	  relations,	  and	  in	  that	  case	  it	  would	  not	  be	  difficult	  to	  get	  rid	  of	  it.	  	   Even	   if	  one	   looks	  at	   text	   (1)	  with	   the	  background	  of	   the	  whole	  chapter	   II	  of	  
Appearance	   and	   Reality,	   to	  which	   it	   belongs,	   the	   situation	   apparently	   does	   not	  change	  significantly.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  regress	  (paragraph	  5	  of	  the	  chapter)	  makes	  its	   appearance	   at	   the	   end	   of	   a	   long	   chain	   of	   reasoning	   (paragraphs	   2-­‐5),	   and	  seems	  to	  constitute	  a	  rather	  special	  argument,	  for	  a	  special	  case16,	  so	  that	  its	  role	  in	  Bradley’s	  general	  strategy	  gives	  the	  impression	  of	  being	  minor	  and	  subsidiary.	  In	   an	   important	   paper	   specifically	   devoted	   to	   the	   chain	   of	   reasoning	   of	  paragraphs	   2-­‐5,	   Donald	   Baxter	   actually	   describes	   the	   regress	   passage	   as	   the	  “tying	  up	  of	  a	   loose	  end”:	  “For	  reasons	  I	  don’t	  yet	  understand	  this	  tying	  up	  of	  a	  loose	   end	   is	   the	   most	   famous	   part	   of	   Bradley’s	   discussion,	   the	   part	   with	   his	  notorious	  regress”17.	  	   Second,	  the	  paragraphs	  immediately	  preceding	  the	  regress	  argument	  contain	  a	   very	   tangled	   and	   sometimes	   obscure	   chain	   of	   reasoning,	   whose	   connection	  with	   the	   regress	   is	   not	   at	   all	   clear,	   and	   which	   may	   appear	   rather	   weak	   and	  confused.	  As	  to	  the	  uncertain	  connection	  with	  the	  regress,	   it	   is	  noteworthy	  that	  in	   his	   classic	   book	   on	   Bradley,	   Richard	   Wollheim	   completely	   separates	   the	  analysis	   of	   the	   arguments	   of	   the	   first	   part	   (paragraphs	   2-­‐4)	   and	   that	   of	   the	  regress	   (paragraph	   5):	   the	   former	   are	   discussed	   under	   the	   general	   heading	   of	  “predication	   as	   identity”18,	   the	   latter	   is	   embedded	   into	   the	   topic	   of	   internal	   vs.	  external	  relations19.	  As	  to	  the	  supposed	  weakness	  and	  confusion	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  reasoning	  preceding	  the	  regress	  argument,	  it	  is	  usually	  maintained	  that	  Bradley’s	  main	  aim	  is	  that	  of	  accounting	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  predication	  (i.e.,	  the	  attribution	  of	  a	  property	   to	  a	   thing),	  and	  that	   the	   fundamental	  presupposition	  of	  Bradley’s	  analysis	  is	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  “is”	  of	  predication	  with	  the	  “is”	  of	  identity	  (cf.	  Wollheim	  above).	  All	  that	  has	  indirect	  consequences	  for	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  regress	  as	  well.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	  once	  more	   the	   regress	  argument	   turns	  up	  as	  isolated	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   preceding	   paragraphs:	   the	   latter	   are	   supposed	   to	  deal	  with	  the	  case	  of	  properties,	  the	  former	  with	  that	  of	  relations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  whole	  discussion	  on	  predication	  as	  identity	  may	  appear	  as	  the	  result	  of	  mere	  muddle-­‐headedness:	  since	  Bradley	  confuses	  predication	  with	  identity,	  it	  is	  no	   surprise	   that	   he	   comes	   out	   with	   such	   bizarre	   conclusions!	   And	   this	  supposedly	  blatant	  confusion	  casts	  its	  shadow	  also	  on	  the	  regress,	  which	  ends	  up	  being	  a	  strange	  appendix	  to	  a	  strange	  argument.	  	   A	  different	  perspective	  can	  be	  obtained	   if	  a	  stricter	  continuity	   is	  recognized	  between	  paragraphs	  2-­‐4	  and	  5	  of	  chapter	  II	  of	  Appearance	  and	  Reality,	  so	  that	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The	  issue	  of	  Bradley’s	  conception	  of	  relations	  is	  complex,	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	  dealt	  with	  here.	  For	  some	   rectifications	   of	   the	   traditional	   view	   of	   Bradley	   as	   a	   champion	   of	   internal	   relations	   cf.	  Candlish	  2007.	  For	  Bradley’s	  mature	  views	  on	  the	  matter	  cf.	  Bradley	  1935.	  16	   It	   is	   introduced	  by	   the	  words:	   “But	   let	   us	   attempt	   another	   exit	   from	   this	  bewildering	   circle”	  (Bradley	  1893,	  p.	  17).	  17	  Baxter	  1996,	  p.	  21.	  18	  Wollheim	  1969,	  pp.	  71-­‐87.	  19	  Wollheim	  1969,	  pp.	  102-­‐120.	  
single	  argument	   in	   two	  steps	  ensues,	  which	  –	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  –	   is	  very	  close	   to	  argument	  (A-­‐B)	  of	  the	  unity	  interpretation.	  Let	  us	  look	  at	  the	  text.	  	   The	   discussion	   is	   introduced	   as	   dealing	   with	   the	   relationship	   between	  “substantive”	  and	  “adjective”	  (as	  the	  title	  of	  the	  chapter	  suggests),	  or	  between	  a	  thing	  and	  its	  quality.	  In	  paragraph	  2	  the	  famous	  example	  of	  the	  lump	  of	  sugar	  is	  put	  forward:	  	   We	  may	   take	   the	   familiar	   instance	   of	   a	   lump	   of	   sugar.	   This	   is	   a	   thing,	   and	   it	   has	  properties,	  adjectives	  which	  qualify	  it.	  It	  is,	  for	  example,	  white,	  and	  hard,	  and	  sweet.	  The	  sugar,	  we	  say,	  is	  all	  that;	  but	  what	  the	  is	  can	  really	  mean	  seems	  doubtful.	  A	  thing	  is	   not	   any	   one	   of	   its	   qualities,	   if	   you	   take	   that	   quality	   by	   itself;	   if	   ‘sweet’	  were	   the	  same	  as	  ‘simply	  sweet’,	  the	  thing	  would	  clearly	  be	  not	  sweet.	  And,	  again,	  in	  so	  far	  as	  sugar	  is	  sweet	  it	  is	  not	  white	  or	  hard;	  for	  these	  properties	  are	  all	  distinct.	  Nor,	  again,	  can	  the	  thing	  be	  all	  its	  properties,	  if	  you	  take	  them	  each	  severally.	  Sugar	  is	  obviously	  no	  mere	  whiteness,	  mere	  hardness,	  and	  mere	  sweetness;	  for	  its	  reality	  lies	  somehow	  in	  its	  unity.20	  	  It	   seems	   indeed	   that	   the	   starting	   question	   concerns	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   “is”	   of	  predication	   in	  sentences	  such	  as	   “This	   lump	  of	  sugar	   is	   sweet”.	  But	   if	  one	  pays	  attention	   to	   the	   flow	  of	   the	  argument,	   then	  one	  can	  see	   that	   it	   insensibly	   turns	  into	  a	  different	  question,	  concerning	  the	  inner	  constitution	  of	  the	  lump	  of	  sugar	  itself.	   That	   appears	   as	  more	   evident	   if	   we	   read	   the	   following	   paragraph.	   Here	  Bradley,	  after	  having	  abruptly	  abandoned	  what	  seemed	  his	  initial	  hypothesis,	  i.e.,	  that	   things	   and	   their	   qualities	   must	   be	   analysed	   according	   to	   the	   scheme	  substance/attribute,	  moves	  to	  the	  bundle	  view:	  	   But	   it	   is	   our	   emphasis,	   perhaps,	   on	   the	   aspect	   of	   unity	   which	   has	   caused	   this	  confusion.	  Sugar	   is,	  of	   course,	  not	   the	  mere	  plurality	  of	   its	  different	  adjectives;	  but	  why	  should	   it	  be	  more	  than	  its	  properties	   in	  relation?	  When	   ‘white’,	   ‘hard’,	   ‘sweet’,	  and	   the	   rest	   coexist	   in	   a	   certain	   way,	   that	   is	   surely	   the	   secret	   of	   the	   thing.	   The	  qualities	   are,	   and	   are	   in	   relation.	   But	   here,	   as	   before,	   when	   we	   leave	   phrases	   we	  wander	   among	   puzzles,	   ‘Sweet’,	   ‘white’,	   and	   ‘hard’	   seem	   now	   the	   subjects	   about	  which	  we	  are	  saying	  something.21	  	   Bradley	  is	  not	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  predication	  anymore,	  at	  least	  in	  its	  original	  form;	  rather	  he	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  correct	  ontological	  analysis	  of	  a	  thing	  such	  as	  the	  lump	  of	  sugar.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  “is”	  he	  is	  interested	  in	  is	  not	  the	  one	  that	  occurs	  in	  sentences	  such	  as	  “The	  lump	  of	  sugar	  is	  sweet”,	  but	  the	  one	  that	  occurs	  in	  sentences	  such	  as	  “The	  lump	  of	  sugar	  is	  the	  plurality	  of	  its	  different	  adjectives”,	   which	   is	   clearly	   the	   “is”	   of	   identity.	   In	   his	   detailed	   examination	   of	  these	  passages,	  Baxter	  has	  persuasively	   shown	   that	   the	   “is”	  Bradley	   is	   arguing	  about	   is	   always	   that	   of	   identity22.	   My	   contention	   is	   that	   this	   is	   not	   due	   to	  confusion,	  or	  to	  a	  more	  or	  less	  implicit	  and	  more	  or	  less	  mistaken	  identification	  of	   the	   two	  meanings.	   Rather,	   Bradley	   has	   really	   been	   interested	   in	   the	   “is”	   of	  identity	  from	  the	  beginning,	  appearances	  notwithstanding23.	  More	  than	  that,	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Bradley	  1893,	  p.	  16.	  21	  Bradley	  1893,	  pp.	  16-­‐17.	  22	  Cf.	  Baxter	  1996.	  23	  It	  is	  to	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  the	  attribution	  of	  a	  quality	  to	  a	  thing	  to	  the	  consideration	  of	  the	   thing	   itself	   as	   a	   complex	   of	   which	   the	   quality	   is	   part	   is	   remarkably	   natural	   in	   Bradley’s	  
was	   not	   even	   interested	   in	   the	   nature	   of	   identity	   in	   itself,	   but	   in	   the	   correct	  analysis	   of	   things,	   i.e.,	   complexes.	   His	   point	   is,	   of	   course,	   that	   no	   unity,	   i.e.,	   no	  unified	   complex,	   can	   be	   satisfactorily	   accounted	   for	   if	   we	   start	   from	   its	  constituents.	  But	   let	   us	   come	   back	   to	   Bradley’s	   arguments.	   After	   a	   somewhat	   tangled	  examination	  of	  different	  alternative	  analyses,	  we	  read:	  	  We	   seem	   unable	   to	   clear	   ourselves	   of	   the	   old	   dilemma,	   If	   you	   predicate	   what	   is	  different,	  you	  ascribe	   to	   the	  subject	  what	   it	   is	  not;	  and	   if	  you	  predicate	  what	   is	  not	  different,	  you	  say	  nothing	  at	  all.24	  	  Once	  more,	  where	  Bradley	  seems	  to	  speak	  of	  predication,	  he	  is	  really	  speaking	  of	  identity:	   the	   “old	   dilemma”	   thus	   appears	   more	   to	   the	   point.	   Following	   a	  suggestion	   by	   Baxter,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   Bradley	   as	   putting	   forth	   an	   alternative:	  when	  we	  consider	  a	  thing	  that	  is	  a	  complex	  (such	  as	  the	  lump	  of	  sugar)	  we	  can	  identify	  it	  with	  (i)	  one	  of	  its	  quality;	  (ii)	  (all	  of)	  its	  qualities	  “severally”	  taken	  (i.e.,	  with	   its	   qualities	   “as	  many”);	   (iii)	   its	   qualities	   in	   some	   “one-­‐making	   relation”25	  (i.e.,	   the	   qualities	   somehow	   united	   into	   a	   complex).	   To	   put	   it	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	  closer	   to	   the	   contemporary	   ontological	   parlance,	  when	   analysing	   facts,	  we	   can	  identify	   them	  with	   (i)	   one	   of	   their	   constituents;	   (ii)	   (all	   of)	   their	   constituents	  separately	   considered	   (i.e.,	   the	  mere	   aggregate,	   list,	   etc.	   of	   their	   constituents);	  (iii)	  their	  constituents	  already	  united	  into	  a	  fact.	  Now,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  solution	  (i)	  is	   unacceptable	   (by	   the	   way,	   it	   could	   presumably	   be	   prompted	   only	   by	   a	  confusion	   between	   predication	   and	   identity).	   But	   (ii)	   is	   also	   clearly	   wrong:	   a	  mere	   list	   of	   constituents	   does	   not	   amount	   to	   a	   fact.	   (iii),	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	  correct,	  but	  at	  the	  price	  of	  saying	  something	  obvious,	  i.e.,	  that	  a	  fact	  is	  a	  fact,	  that	  some	  qualities	   related	   together	  are	   some	  qualities	   related	   together,	   etc.	   In	   this	  way,	  with	   Bradley’s	  words,	   “you	   say	   nothing	   at	   all”:	   or,	   as	   Bradley	   says	   a	   few	  lines	  later,	  “If	  you	  mean	  that	  A	  and	  B	  in	  such	  a	  relation	  are	  so	  related,	  you	  appear	  to	  mean	  nothing	  […]	  the	  predicate	  […]	  is	  idle”26.	  	   We	   have	   thus	   reconstructed	   part	   (A)	   of	   the	   (A-­‐B)	   argument;	   and	   now	   the	  regress	  passage	  (text	  (1))	  occurs.	  Since	  all	   the	  three	  alternatives	   just	  examined	  fail,	   one	   could	   think	   of	   adding	   some	   further	   constituents	   to	   those	   already	  mentioned.	  Such	   further	  constituents	  are	   introduced	  with	   the	  overt	  purpose	  of	  accounting	   for	   the	   unity	   (connectedness)	   of	   the	   other	   constituents:	   they	   are	  specifically	   devised	   for	   that	   task.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   relating	   (or	   connecting)	  function	   is	   not	   “absorbed”	   in	   the	   related	   constituents	   (“let	   us	   abstain	   from	  making	  the	  relation	  an	  attribute	  of	  the	  related”,	  as	  Bradley	  says),	  but	  is	  somehow	  “abstracted”	  and	  “reified”	  into	  a	  distinct	  constituent	  (“let	  us	  make	  it	  more	  or	  less	  independent”).	  But	  of	  course	  this	  will	  not	  do,	  since	  the	  same	  difficulty	  arises	  as	  before	  (only	  this	  time	  with	  a	  somewhat	  longer	  list	  of	  constituents).	  And	  that	  is	  of	  course	  the	  step	  (B)	  of	  the	  argument.	  What	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  paragraph	  5	  (text	  (1))	  is	  not	  the	  special	  case	  of	  relational	  facts	  vs.	  that	  of	  predicative	  facts.	  Rather	  it	  is	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  philosophy,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  ultimate	  form	  of	  any	  judgment	  ‘S	  is	  P’	  is	  ‘The	  Reality	  is	  such	  that	  S-­‐P’.	  What	  constitutes	  the	  subject	  can	  be	  legitimately	  moved	  to	  the	  predicate	  position,	  so	  that	  a	  question	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  a	  thing	  (S)	  and	  one	  of	  its	  quality	  (P)	  may	  easily	  turn	  into	  a	  question	  concerning	  the	  constitution	  of	  the	  thing	  itself	  (S-­‐P).	  24	  Bradley	  1893,	  p.	  17.	  25	  Cf.	  Baxter,	  p.	  5.	  26	  Bradley	  183,	  p.	  17.	  
case	  in	  which	  the	  connecting	  function	  has	  been	  attributed	  to	  distinct	  constituents	  (you	   can	   call	   them	   “relations”,	   and	   you	   can	   call	   such	   facts	   “relational”	   if	   you	  want)	  vs.	  the	  case	  in	  which	  no	  special	  constituents	  for	  this	  role	  have	  been	  singled	  out:	  step	  (B)	  after	  step	  (A).	  	  	  4.	  Another	  look	  at	  the	  same	  question	  
	  	   In	  a	  recent	  book	  on	  the	  philosophy	  of	  Bradley,	  Luigi	  Cimmino	  holds	  that	  two	  main	  interpretations	  of	  the	  regress	  argument	  are	  available:	  there	  is	  a	  “naive”	  and	  a	   “sophisticated”	   interpretation27.	   According	   to	   the	   naive	   interpretation,	   the	  argument	  purports	   to	   show	   that	  when	  we	  have	  complexes	  made	  up	  of	  distinct	  elements,	  the	  elements	  responsible	  for	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  complexes	  need	  in	  their	  turn	   further	   elements	   in	   order	   to	   be	   “connected”	   to	   the	   elements	   they	   are	  supposed	   to	   connect.	   Cimmino	   comments	   that	   this	   version	   of	   the	   argument	  seems	  to	  be	  rather	  weak.	  It	  is	  not	  difficult	  to	  dispense	  with	  it	  by	  observing	  that	  it	  simply	   disregards	   the	   obvious	   fact	   that	   relations	   “relate”	   by	   their	   very	   nature:	  the	  elements	  introduced	  to	  account	  for	  unity	  cannot	  be	  put	  on	  the	  same	  level	  as	  the	  other	  elements	  to	  be	  connected.	  Historically	  that	  has	  been	  a	  rather	  common	  reply	   to	   Bradley’s	   regress.	   According	   to	   the	   sophisticated	   interpretation,	   the	  argument	   purports	   to	   show	   that	   no	  mere	   enumeration	   of	   constituents	   can	   by	  itself	  amount	  to	  a	  fact,	  since	  all	  the	  constituents	  may	  well	  be	  there,	  without	  the	  fact	  being	  there	  (and	  that	  even	  if	  among	  the	  constituents	  there	  are	  some	  whose	  explicit	  function	  is	  that	  of	  “connecting”	  the	  other	  constituents).	  	   As	   it	   is	   not	   difficult	   to	   see,	   Cimmino’s	   naive	   interpretation	   more	   or	   less	  corresponds	  to	  the	  interpretation	  that	  regards	  Bradley’s	  regress	  as	  an	  argument	  having	   to	  do	  exclusively	  or	  primarily	  with	   the	  nature	  of	   relations;	  whereas	   the	  sophisticated	  interpretation	  obviously	  corresponds	  to	  the	  “unity	  interpretation”	  of	   this	   article.	   In	   conclusion,	   what	   I	   would	   like	   to	   suggest	   is	   that	   the	   naive	  interpretation	  comes	  out	  as	  the	  most	  natural	  if	  one	  looks	  at	  the	  regress	  passages	  –	   (1)	   and	   (2)	   –	   in	   isolation;	   but	   as	   soon	   as	   one	   tries	   to	   consider	   them	   in	   their	  context,	  and	  to	   link	  text	  (1)	  with	  the	  arguments	  present	   in	  the	  paragraphs	  that	  precede	  it,	  then	  the	  unity	  interpretation	  (i.e.,	  the	  “sophisticated”	  one),	  though	  not	  immediately	  obvious,	  appears	  as	  the	  most	  pregnant.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Cf.	  Cimmino	  2009,	  chapter	  I.	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